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Globalization, Democracy, and the Need for a
New Administrative Law*
ALFRED C. AMAN, JR.**
INTRODUCTION

American administrative law is inextricably linked with the history of the
relationship of the market to the state. This relationship, especially at the
federal level, has varied over time, from the laissez-faire economic philosophy
that typified federal involvement (or the lack thereof) in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries,' to the interventionist approaches taken by the federal
government during the New Deal and beyond.2 Indeed, modem administrative
law is, in large part, a product of federal attempts to regulate private enterprises
through the creation of federal administrative agencies and administrative
processes designed to control and legitimate agency power.
Elsewhere I have argued that a new administrative law is emerging,
characterized in part by the following factors:
(1) new blends of public and private power at all levels of government;
(2) a redefinition of what is public and what is private;
(3) greater reliance on bargaining and negotiation models of
decisionmaking when it comes to the way the state exercises its power;
(4) a diminution of public participation stemming from increased reliance
on privatization and, in effect, the delegation of public functions to
private entities; and
the role of noneconomic
(5) a market discourse that arguably narrows
3
processes.
values in decisionmaking
* This article began as a paper given at two conferences in 2002. It was originally published in 49 UCLA
L. REv. 1687 (2002).
** Alfred C. Aman, Jr. is the Dean and Roscoe C. O'Byme Professor of Law at Indiana University School
of Law-Bloomington. I wish to thank Professors John Applegate, Yvonne Cripps, Rob Fischman, Carol
Greenhouse, and Lauren Robel for their comments and suggestions on this Article. This Article also benefited
from a faculty workshop at the Cornell Law School and, of course, the conference of which this was a part at
the UCLA School of Law. I also wish to thank Russell Menyhart,'03 and Jason Clagg, '03 for their excellent
research assistance.
1. See Robert L. Rabin, FederalRegulation in HistoricalPerspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1248

(1986).
2. See id. at 1248-53.
3. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Law For a New Century,in THE PROVTNCE OF AMINISTRATIVE LAw 90, 96-97

(Michael Taggart ed., 1997).
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In this Article, I will argue that these emerging trends are indicative of the
ways globalization has changed the nature of the relationship of markets to the
state, creating a democracy deficit and necessitating new roles for
administrative law.4 I will make this argument by focusing primarily on
privatization and, in particular, the privatization of prisons and social services
for the poor.5 These areas highlight the importance of providing citizens with
opportunities to raise issues that do not easily translate into economic terms
alone. Moreover, prisoners, as well as other needy citizens in our society, are
not likely to have much impact in normal political arenas; accordingly, they
have particular needs for transparency and participation in the processes that
affect them directly. The democracy issues raised by privatization and
globalization are especially apparent in these contexts.
One form of governmental intervention into the market that has been quite
rare in the United States has been nationalization-that is, government
ownership of industries such as electric utility companies, communications
companies, or airlines.6 The U.S. approach has been to regulate the private
enterprises that provide such services. As a consequence, what I have
elsewhere called the Global Era of Administrative Law, has been dominated by
various degrees of deregulation, rather than the kind of privatization that results
from the sale of governmentally owned enterprises. 8
Both privatization and deregulation take many forms. Some forms of
deregulation, such as those accomplished by legislation, result in the outright
repeal of regulatory structures and agency-enabling acts; 9 others, instituted by
administrative agencies themselves, result in the repeal of some rules and/or

4. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Globalizing State: A Future-OrientedPerspectiveon the Public/Private
Distinction, Federalismand Democracy, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 769 (1998).
5. As Judge Patricia Wald has noted:
The privatization train is not reserved for criminals. State and local governments have
contracted with private operations to take care of the most vulnerable, dependent, and
disempowered members of society-children, the unemployed, the physically and
mentally disabled-whose servicing for most of the twentieth century has been
considered quintessentially a "public" responsibility.
Honorable Patricia M. Wald, LookingForwardto the Next Millennium: SocialPreviews to Legal Change, 70
TEMP. L. REV. 1085, 1098 (1997).
6. Though nationalization is rare in the United States, there are some exceptions. The Tennessee Valley
Authority was created as a government corporation to undertake the building and operation of dams. See
Richard Wirtz, The Legal Framework of the Tennessee Valley Authority, 43 TENN. L. REV. 573, 574-75
(1976).
7. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA 2 (1992).

8. See id.
9. See Airline Deregulation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
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their replacement with rules that use markets and market approaches as
regulatory tools, thereby replacing command-control regulatory approaches
with incentive-based regulation.' Such uses of the market and market-based
approaches are, in this sense, a means to an end, not ends in themselves. At the
federal agency level, such forms of deregulation usually are subject to the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)." An agency's repeal or change of an
existing rule, for example, is treated procedurally the same way as the
promulgation of a new rule. 2 The substitution of market approaches for more
direct regulation has usually been upheld by reviewing courts, particularly
when economic regulation has been involved.13
Just as there are many forms and degrees of congressional and agency
deregulation, privatization also can take many forms, and these forms represent
varying degrees of separation from the public body delegating responsibilities
to the private actors involved. As Professor Lester Salamon has noted,
privatization in the United States has meant the development of various tools of
governance. 14 Indeed, what he calls the "new governance" includes a variety of
tools that government at all levels can employ in carrying out their tasks,
including contracting out or outsourcing, grants, tax expenditures, vouchers,
direct loans, government corporations, and franchises.' 5
There are similarities and differences between different forms and degrees
of deregulation and the various forms that privatization can take. Like
deregulation, some forms of privatization are the result of legislative action,
which seeks to provide a market where a regulatory regime once existed. For
example, the legislature may sell off a governmentally owned entity to private

10. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming EnvironmentalLaw, 37 STAN. L. REV.
1333, 1341 (1985).
11. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (2000).
12. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 30
(1983).
13. See AMAN, supra note 7, at 42-62.
14. See Lester M. Salamon, The New Governanceand the Tools ofPublicAction: An Introduction,in THE
TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT 1, 1 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002).

15. See id. at 33. In addition to tools for providing governmental services, agencies utilize similar market
approaches, such as regulatory contracts to carry out their statutory duties. See Jody Freeman, The
Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 189-201 (2000). For excellent analysis of various
public/private forms of governance, and the relationships between public and private actions, see generally
Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543 (2000) [hereinafter The
Private Role in Public Governance]; Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New
AdministrativeLaw, in THE LIMITS OF LEGAL ORDER 331 (1999).
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parties, as was common in Europe in the 1980s.16 Like the deregulation that
results from the wholesale statutory repeal of a regulatory regime,17 the market
is intended to replace the government completely when government-owned
assets are sold to private buyers.
Perhaps the most common form of privatization in the United States-and
the primary focus of this Article-is the use of the private sector to deliver what
once were governmentally provided social services. The primary governance
tool in these cases is the contract. The management of prisons, for example,
has been increasingly outsourced to the private sector at both the federal and
local levels. 8 Garbage and snow removal also are now commonly handled by
private providers,' 9 and various aspects of welfare administration,20 such as
eligibility determinations, are carried out by private entities. Contracting out, or
outsourcing, for such purposes is somewhat akin to agency deregulation, in
which government agencies remain involved but now use market approaches to
carry out their statutorily mandated goals. In the outsourcing context, a
governmental agency is still responsible for the services provided, but has
decided to opt for a private means of carrying them out. What differentiates
this kind of privatization from deregulation, however, is the fact that
privatization involves services, not regulation, and private parties now perform
the functions involved. In effect, the government delegates responsibility for
16. For an interesting discussion of the differences between privatization and deregulation in the United
States and Europe, see generally Giandomenico Majone, Paradoxes of Privatizationand Deregulation,in
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 4 (1994).
17. See, e.g., Airline Deregulation Act, supra note 9.
18. See Shymeka L. Hunter, More Than Just a PrivateAffair: Is The Practiceof IncarceratingAlaska
Prisonersin Private Out-Of-State Prisons Unconstitutional?,17 ALASKA L. REV. 319, 327-28 (2000).
Given the way the federal government and states like Alaska have supported the
private sector's prison ventures and the booming market, it is perhaps not surprising
that by 1996 there were more than one hundred private jails and prisons located across
twenty-seven states. As of 1997, the private prison industry was grossing 550 million
dollars annually; Alaska is among the twenty-five states that make use of private
prisons. Thirty-one states, the Federal system, and Washington, D.C., reported a
housing total of 71,208 prisoners in private facilities in 1999. Specifically, Alaska
housed thirty-five percent of its prison population in private facilities during 1999,
making it second only to New Mexico's thirty-nine percent.
Id.
19. See Lewis D. Solomon, Reflections on the Future of Business Organizations,20 CARDOZO L. REV.
1213, 1216 (1999) ("Virtually any asset or service that a local government owns or provides has been
privatized somewhere in the United States in some manner, including fire protection, police protection, waste
water treatment, street lighting, tree trimming, snow removal, parking structures, railroads, hospitals,jails, and
even cemeteries.")
20. See Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and
EntrepreneurialGovernment, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1207-08 (2000).
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services to private actors. When agencies employ market incentives or marketbased rules to carry out their goals, they are engaged directly in regulatory
action and the agency itself-already a state actor-usually remains in charge. 2
The public/private partnerships that result when agencies contract out for social
services, however, implicate administrative law in ways that are more complex
than when an administrative agency remains directly involved in the regulatory
process.22

In this Article, I focus primarily on privatization in the form of outsourcing
basic social services, because it is especially in such contexts that we can see
the impact of globalization on the domestic scene. I will make a two-part
argument in this regard. First, I will argue that privatization today should be
understood as a principal effect of globalization. In this sense, it is not merely
one means among others for making government more efficient or for
expanding the private sector. Nor is it just a reflection of current political
trends and a swing of the regulatory pendulum from liberal to conservative.
Rather, the increasing reliance on "the new governance ' 23 is indicative of a
changing relationship between the market and the state, one characterized by a
fusion of public and private values, rhetoric, and approaches-a fusion that is
itself integral to the fusion of global and local economies. Privatization is the
result of these fusions. It, in effect, increases the exposure of the state to
external economic and political pressures that tend to accelerate globalization,
in large part, because private actors fully exposed to the global economy now
carry out the delegated tasks. The global political economy places great
pressures on all entities-public and private-to be cost-effective if they wish
24
to be competitive. This encourages such delegations on the part of the state,
and it raises concerns over whether the cost savings that result from such public

21. This is, however, not always the case. When, for example, agencies rely on tradeable pollution permits,
involved to undertake the enforcement against those
they create incentives on the part of the private parties
who cheat. The government is, in effect, not involved in the enforcement of the requirements ofthese permits
and the choice of tradeable permits rather than command control regulations lessens the direct involvement of
the state in the enforcement process.
22. For the most part, agency deregulation in the form of market incentives largely overlaps with what
might be called the reinvention of government approach to reform. For a discussion of how this approach
differs from privatization in an ideological sense and privatization in the sense of market tools for public
purposes, see Salamon, supra note 14, at 14-16. For a discussion of some of the legal issues presented by
reinvention of government approaches, see Alfred C. Aman, Jr., A Global Perspectiveon CurrentRegulatory
Reforms: Rejection, Relocation or Reinvention?, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 450-63 (1995).
23. See supra note 14.
24. For a discussion of the various ways that competition in a global economy can affect state entities,
politics, and the law they apply, see Aman, supra note 4, at 780-91.
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delegations to private entities occur at the expense of democratic processes,
legitimacy, and individual justice. Given the role that the public/private
distinction plays in U.S. administrative law, privatization, in this global context,
tends to reduce the democratic public sphere in favor of other arrangements that
are likely to be less transparent and accountable to the public, and less exposed
to competing value regimes. I call this scenario the "democracy deficit."
The democracy deficit is primarily the result of the application of a
traditional conception of the public/private distinction that is likely to lessen
considerably the public sector's responsibilities for transparency and
accountability when private actors perform certain tasks. Justifications often
provided for such an approach begin with the assumption that policymaking
and administration can, in fact, be separated-an assumption that most
commentators reject. 25 Even in privatized contexts, private actors inevitably
make policy when they carry out their delegated tasks and interpret the
contracts under which they operate. The second element of my argument, then,
is that a new kind of administrative law can and should be created to respond to
the "democracy deficit" associated with privatization. It need not rely solely on
traditional procedural approaches, arguably designed for governmental agencies
carrying out regulatory functions. At the same time, it is important to
emphasize that what is at stake are the values of public law-transparency,
participation, and fairness. Various procedural approaches may be necessary to
ensure the realization of these values. The values of the APA, though not
necessarily the precise procedural devices it currently employs, 6 need to be
extended to various hybrid, public/private arrangements if we are to ensure the
legitimacy of those partnerships. Given a reorientation of states and markets
25. Jody Freeman has described the actual cumulative process of policymaking and subsequent
implementation and enforcement as "fluid." She explains that "[a]dministrative law scholars tend to take
snapshots of specific moments in the decisionmaking process (such as the moment of rule promulgation) and
analyze them in isolation. Rules develop meaning, however, only through the fluid processes of design,
implementation, enforcement, and negotiation." The Private Role in Public Governance, supra note 15, at
572; see also Michael Aronson, A Public Lawyer's Responses to Privatization and Outsourcing,in THE
PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 50, 50-58 (Michael Taggart ed., 1999).

26. For purposes of this Article, references to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) are intended to
suggest the use of procedures for hybrid decisionmaking that may or may not be the same as the procedures
found in the APA. In many instances, if the APA is to apply it must be amended to fit the needs of hybrid
arrangements involved, such as the provisions dealing with contracting out agency duties, see text at notes
10 1-102, infra; in others, it is important to determine which types of private entities should be affected by
APA extensions. For a discussion of the scope and coverage of the Freedom of Information Act, as it relates
to the private sector, see Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Information, Privacy, and Technology: Citizens, Clients or
Consumers?, in FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 320, 333-36 (Jack Beatson &
Yvonne Cripps eds., 2001).
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due to globalization, this Article will set forth some of the key issues that a new
administrative law should now address and argue that the underlying theory and
purpose of administrative law need to be reconceptualized.
The pragmatics of globalization make privatization the critical terrain in
which a new administrative law might respond by assuring public fora for input
and debate and a flow of information that can help create a meaningful politics
around the decisions of private actors. Globalization also highlights the
changing ways in which the state now interacts with private entities and the
consequent need for a new theoretical conception of administrative law. To
develop these themes, Part I of this Article first discusses more fully the
relationship of privatization to the state, the private sector, and law. In light of
the changing relationship of the state to the private sector, Part II then
highlights some of the issues that a new administrative law should consider. In
Part II, I argue for a reconceptualization of the underlying theory and purpose
of administrative law in these privatized contexts. Part III concludes by
suggesting procedural reforms to deal with these issues.
I. THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON STATES AND MARKETS
First, I turn to globalization as the context for privatization. Globalization
is a short-hand term for complex social, economic, and political processes that
in effect denationalize and deterritorialize states.27 The transnational flow of
capital and communication increasingly occurs with little or no agency of the
state. At the same time, for states to deal effectively with transnational
problems such as pollution or economic opportunities, such as the attraction of
investment from outside investors, they must partner with entities that
selectively suspend or, in effect, deterritorialize their boundaries.28
27. See Jost DelbrUck, Globalization ofLaw, Politics,and Markets-Implicationsfor Domestic Law--A
European Perspective, I IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 9 (1993); see generally PETER DICKEN, GLOBAL

SHIFT 1-8 (2d ed. 1992) (analyzing the process of globalization resulting from the interactions between states
and corporations); WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE WORLD, READY OR NOT (1997); KENICHI OHMAE, THE
BORDERLESS WORLD: POWER AND STRATEGY IN THE INTERLINKED ECONOMY (1990); SASKIA SASSEN,
CITIES N A WORLD ECONOMY (1994); SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY: NEW YORK, LONDON, TOKYO

(1991) [hereinafter THE GLOBAL CITY]; Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Earth as Eggshell Victim: A Global
Perspectiveon DomesticRegulation, 102 YALE L.J. 2107 (1993) [hereinafter Eggshell];Alfred C. Aman, Jr.,
Introduction to Symposium, The Globalizationof Law, Politics and Markets, I IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
1(1993); Saskia Sassen, Toward a FeministAnalytics ofthe GlobalEconomy, 4 ND J.GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
7 (1996).
28. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Privatizationand the DemocracyProblem in Globalization: Making Markets
More Accountable Through Administrative Law, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1477, 1483-84 (2001).
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Globalization draws states and nonstate entities into a range of partnerships
and hybrid forms of governance that push and pull the "national interest" across
national lines, and compress the national interest with economic interests. In
practical terms, there is much more competition at the global level for
investment and among private firms for market share. These same kinds of
denationalizing forces and extraterritorial needs affect all levels of government,
local, state, and national. By delegating public functions to private entities,
governmental units become more and more like private firms competing in a
global marketplace.29
A. The Global Marketplace
If we were to view the shift from public to private as only another possible
regulatory outcome, one driven either by public-spirited interest group politics,
or the capture of the legislative process by powerful actors, one could argue that
this is just a new regulatory technique, or a more cost-effective way of carrying
out the tasks of government in a competent fashion. "Third-party governance"
represents a set of effective tools for achieving public ends; 30 but this not the
full story. The shift from hierarchy to networks that these new approaches
embody 3' is indicative of changes that resonate with fundamental changes in
our overall political economy. The delegation of public functions to private
bodies now occurs as part of a larger, global regulatory context in which
nonstate actors play an increasingly prominent role at all levels of
government. 32 At the state or local level, problems may have transjurisdictional
aspects that highlight the limitations of the territorial boundaries that define
states and various government units. The territorial limitations of state power
can be overcome by partnerships with entities that have no such restrictions or
with other states who share similar concerns. There are strong incentives and,

29. States can also feel pressure to act like private firms by trying to speed up their reaction time to issues,
to resolve issues quickly, or to sidestep aspects of the political process. See, e.g., Natalie R. Minter, Fast
Track Procedures: Do They Infringe Upon CongressionalConstitutionalRights?, I SYRACUSE J. LEGIS. &

POL'Y 107 (1995) (arguing that utilizing fast track legislation removes power from the legislative branch in
favor of the executive branch).
30. Salamon, supra note 14, at 15.
31. Seeid. at I1-14.

32. For a discussion of the rise of and importance of nonstate actors in international law, see Stephan Hobe,
Global Challenges to Statehood: The Increasingly Important Role ofNongovernmental Organizations, 5
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 191, 192-93 (1997).
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indeed, often a need on the part of the public sector to partner with other states
and with private entities, if a particular governmental unit is to succeed.33
The global economic context in which many industries now operate adds
another important dimension to these incentives to partner. The global
economy is marked by increased competition in both the public and the private
sectors. As private companies vie for markets, states and localities vie for
investment and the economic prosperity it spawns. The currency used in this
competition often results in low taxes and low regulatory costs derived from
various forms of deregulation as inducements to investment in a particular
place.34 It can also result in different choices by governmental entities in how
they decide to fulfill their public duties. Efficiency concerns make direct
private providers of services who can conceptualize their service area without
regard to territorial boundaries very attractive, particularly if they are able to
achieve their economic goals more efficiently. A company that manages
private prisons, for example, can theoretically provide its services throughout
the nation, not simply in one jurisdiction and, in so doing, realize economies of
scale that a more territory-specific governmental entity might not achieve. Over
and above economies of scale, private actors and market approaches can
introduce new management techniques more easily, perhaps fire workers more
readily, and make some of the tough resource allocation decisions that public
officials might just as well avoid."
Such efficiencies, the extraterritorial perspective, and pragmatic flexibility
that private actors can provide encourage privatization. The affirmative
involvement of the private sector in public functions through privatization may
increase efficiency and encourage innovation, but particularly in the context of
social services traditionally provided by the government,36 procedural and
33. See Todd Wildermuth, Counties Consider Swapping Some Snow Removal Road Duties, TRINIDAD
PLUS & THE RATON RANGE, Mar. 24, 1998 ("Certain roads in one county are more easily accessible from the
neighboring county, making it convenient and time-effective for the neighboring county's crews to handle
snow removal on those portions of road."), availableat http://www.trinidadco.com/stories98/news/03/24/
road.htm (last visited July 13, 2002). Efficiencies like this can also be attained with "regulatory services" as
well. There often are economies of scale to be achieved between state clean air acts and clean water acts.
Pollutants do not follow boundaries, making interstate air compacts (ozone) and watershed management
necessary. See, e.g., Charles E. McChesney II, The Interstate Ozone PollutionNegotiations: OTAG, EPA,
and a NovelApproach to NegotiatedRulemaking, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 615, 615-26 (1999).
34. See Aman, supra note 28, at 1481-83.
35. See id. at 1481-83 (discussing legitimate and illegitimate global currencies used to achieve certain kinds
of efficiencies).
36. Social services that focus primarily on the poor and the disadvantaged do not lend themselves to
economic discourses alone. Moreover, the affected individuals are not as likely to have the kind of attention
from the political system that other more prominent and wealthy groups of voters may have. For a discussion
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structural issues arise that challenge conventional versions of administrative law
theory.
Dimensions of citizenship and opportunities for democratic
participation are often lost in the translation of public values and goals to
market values and market realities. Some of the market-state relationships that
result are structurally flawed in ways that call for a vibrant and new
administrative law, if we are to accomplish the positive aspects of these
public/private partnerships without undermining our roles as citizens.37 Public
law values such as transparency, participation, and neutrality need to be assured
as well, though not necessarily by traditional procedural approaches. Just as so-

called soft law in international law contexts can play a significant role in
shaping the behavior of some states,38 so too can a kind of "soft procedural
law," especially that designed to further the flow of information, affect and
encourage public-regarding behavior on the part of private actors.3 9 Conflicts
of interest, as we shall see,40 may loom large in the fusion of public and private
values that privatization encourages; they need to be minimized, given the
predominance of the profit motive among the for-profit providers of social
services. To achieve such goals without undermining the creativity and
efficiency of public/private partnerships requires a new understanding of the
of the morality of excluding certain citizens from the requirement of being members of the workforce, see
Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court'sDue ProcessCalculusforAdministrativeAdjudicationin Matthews
v. Eldridge?: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28, 46-54 (1976).
37. See text at notes 90-91, infra.
38. See generally Matthew B. Kirsner, Consumer's Union of U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger: A Domestic
Response to Soft Law in the InternationalNormative System, 2 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 41 (1996). Professor
Kirsner notes that:
[T]he normative system of international law is increasingly comprised of legal
standards of vague substance known as "soft law." Such provisions do not create
legally enforceable rights and duties. Rather, these provisions may be unilateral,
voluntary, and enacted outside of official diplomatic channels. The soft law
phenomenon is primarily embodied in economic and political treaties providing for
preliminary consultations or negotiations, as well as resolutions of international
organizations.
Id. at 41 (footnotes omitted).
39. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, CorporateSocial Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization,
35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 735 n. 101 (2002). Professor Williams argues that:
U.S. multinationals bring with them "the glare of public scrutiny and the changes it
can induce in an increasingly global marketplace. When local producers in Vietnam,
Pakistan, or Honduras exploit their work force, few in the West hear of it, especially if
the products are not exported to Western markets. But when those same producers
become suppliers to Reebok, Levi Strauss, or Walt Disney, their actions make
headlines in the United States."
Id.
40. For an extended discussion of the characteristics of the globalizing state and its need to bargain and to
partner, see Aman, supra note 4, at 791-816.
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state's role in a global economy and its relationship to private actors and the
market.
Globalization affects both states and the private sector. States remain
important but must, in many ways, change the ways in which they seek to carry
out their concept of the public interest. Private actors in various industries also
have changed dramatically the way they do business, and private entities in
almost every field are subject to competition worldwide. As the following parts
will show, changes in the ways the public and the private sectors now operate
ultimately affect the law as well.
B. The GlobalizingState
The concept of the globalizing state signifies a state that no longer has a
monopoly on the policies it creates and promulgates, but must increasingly
cooperate, bargain, and partner with other states and private entities to achieve
its goals.4 ' In so doing, it often is under pressure to harmonize or converge its
regulatory approaches with other states as it tries to resolve economic and
environmental issues internationally, and increasingly, it resorts to market
approaches and the delegation of public functions for private entities to carry
out its domestic duties.42 These state to state and public and private
partnerships, of necessity, open the state up to all of the kinds of global
economic pressures prevalent today and, in the process, encourage approaches
to issues that are global in nature. As Saskia Sassen has argued, the state is less
in control of the outcomes of such political and economic processes, in part
because those processes now include actors from other states, as well as
transnational nonstate entities. Sovereignty and territory as we have known
these concepts have become "somewhat de-centered. '' 4 3 The end result is a
state that is itself de-centered and no longer the primary unit of analysis, even in
questions of creating public policy.
44
Global processes de-center the state in various ways. As noted above,
global processes often bypass the state altogether as capital, culture, ideas,
images, and the like flow across boundaries without the direct agency of the
state. a States' powers are fragmented as they increasingly must share them
41. See id. at 812-13.
42. See id. at 815-16.
43. SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? 28-31 (1996).

44. See text accompanying note 40, supra.
45. See generally ARJUN APPADURAi, MODERNITY AT LARGE 237 (1996).
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with other states and nonstate actors to achieve their goals.46 Quite apart from
whether we conceptualize states as strong or weak, they need private entities
and other states to achieve their goals. States are now much more open to the
kinds of global economic pressures experienced by global actors and they
themselves are becoming more global. States' reactions to these processes, be
they the lowering of trade barriers, entering into environmental treaties, or
opting for privatization, encourage and, indeed, accelerate global processes.
The end result is double-edged. As the state responds to global forces and
processes, it accelerates their impact. States do not ultimately disappear in this
process. They remain significant players; however, they are now part of a much
larger network of other actors with whom they are not necessarily or even likely
to be in a hierarchical relationship.4 7 Under such conditions, levels of public
and private power are layered by networks of actors and rules that derive not
only from other states, but private entities as well.48

C. Globalization and the PrivateSector
Just as the globalizing state is a double-edged concept, with the state both
responding to and furthering the processes of globalization, so too is the impact
of the private sector double-edged. As businesses respond to global forces and
technologies, they create new modes of operation and a global economic
infrastructure that accelerates globalization.
46. See Philip G.Cerny, What Next for the State?, in GLOBALIZATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 123,12425 (Eleanore Kofman & Gillian Youngs eds., 1996). He argues that:
[G]lobalization entails the undermining of the public character of public goods and of
the specific character of specific assets, i.e. the privatization and marketization of
economic and political structures. States are pulled between structural pressures and
organizational levels they cannot control. Economic globalization contributes not so
much to the supersession of the state by a homogeneous global order as to the
splintering of the existing political order. Indeed, globalization leads to a growing
disjunction between the democratic, constitutional and social aspirations of peoplewhich are still shaped by and understood through the frame of the territorial state--on
the one hand, and the dissipating possibilities of genuine and effective collective
action through constitutional political processes on the other.
Id. at 130.
47. Global networks and web-like structures at the international level are similar to the networks that make
up the new governance and suffer from many of the same issues and problems involving accountability,
legitimacy, and democracy. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Accountability of Government Networks, 8 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 347, 347-50 (2001) (discussing the difficulties of maintaining accountability across
transnational networks).
48. See GUNTHER TEUBNER, GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE (1997); Harold J. Berman, The Law of
International Commercial Transactions (lex mercatoria), in A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS (lex mercatoria), Part Ill, folio 3 (W. S. Surrey & D. Wallace, Jr. eds., 1983).

2003]

THE NEED FOR A NEW ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Businesses organize themselves in ways that both influence and adapt to
the political, legal economy of which they are a part. During the New Deal and
the state-centered approach to law that dominated that era, corporations were
more national in their orientation and more hierarchical in their dealings within
and outside the corporation. As I have argued elsewhere:
Corporations... could be viewed as comparable in structure
to the large buildings many of them occupied-many floors
high, with the executives at the top and workers scattered
below. The company usually located manufacturing plants
nearby and often kept the materials and inventories necessary
for these plants to function on the premises. 9
Such a place-specific approach to manufacturing is no longer the way most
global companies now do business. New technology industries such as
computers, as well as those whose operations are transformed by such
technologies, such as banking, are now global in scope and operation.50 They
are web-like in the ways in which they use technologies to link up with
suppliers, fabricators, and the manufacturers of some or all of the parts
necessary for the product involved.5' Sometimes it is hard to know where the
center of a particular company is, as it is, in many ways, made up of a series of
independent contractors around the world, each performing a particular task in
the most cost-effective way. 2 Indeed,
transnational corporations decide where it is most costeffective to locate various activities in the value chains
connected with the production and marketing of goods and
services. They may locate research and development in one

49. Eggshell, supra note 27, at 2117.
50. See Wolfgang H. Rein icke, GlobalFinancialMarkets: Pioneersin GlobalPublic Policy, in GLOBAL
PUBLIC POLICY 102, 102-35 (1998).
51. See ROBERT REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS 110-18 (1991).
52. With the growth of vast transnational corporations, corporate national identity has become an
increasingly malleable concept. For example, U.S. corporations are increasingly willing to change their
corporate 'nationality,' to take advantage of lower corporate taxes. See David Cay Johnston, U.S. Companies
File in Bermuda to Slash Tax Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2002, at Al. As a further step towards
decentralization, some companies have taken to forming "virtual corporations," defined as "temporary
network[s] or loose coalition[s] of manufacturing and administrative services that come[] together for a
specific business purpose and then disassemble[] when the purpose has been met." P. Maria Joseph Christie
& Reuven Levary, Virtual Corporations: Recipefor Success, INDUS. MANAGEMENT, July 1, 1998, at 7.
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country, component assembly in another, final assembly in
another country, and distribution networks in yet another.
They also decide how much to customize the globally
conceived products for local markets 5 3
Just as the state is de-centered, so too are many industries that now organize
themselves and operate in a global fashion. Flexibility, networks, and
contractual approaches to manufacturing and other phases of business parallel
the kinds of changes states are experiencing and represent the kinds of

challenges that exist if states are to participate in, or exercise influence over,
aspects of businesses organized in this fashion. That law both influences and is
influenced by the dominant corporate organizational forms of the day is no
surprise. In The AdministrativeProcess,for example, James Landis, one of the
primary architects of the New Deal, looked to business for inspiration when it
came to the constitutional separation-of-powers approaches most appropriate
for administrative agencies. He noted:
[W]hen government concerns itself with the stability of an
industry it is only intelligent realism for it to follow the
industrial rather than the political analogue. It vests the
necessary powers with the administrative authority it creates,
not too greatly concerned with the extent to which such action
does violence to the traditional tripartite theory of government
organization.54
The corporation of the twenty-first century is more flexible, more
multicentered, web-like, and global in its reach than its twentieth-century
ancestors. Law will inevitably follow these new forms, but in so doing, it faces
a number of challenges. There are public law values that global markets are not
likely to take into account and the fluid, network-like structures that various
contractual approaches produce may be at odds with many of the more
traditional, hierarchical assumptions found in many areas of the law. Indeed,
the hierarchical nature of law traditionally conceived along with its placespecific source of authority and legitimacy poses significant, but not
insurmountable, problems for how best to conceptualize and apply a new
administrative law. The multidimensional and decentered nature of both states
53. Aman, supra note 4, at 781; see authorities cited supra in note 37.
54. JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 11-12 (1938).
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and businesses in a global economy encourage a multidimensional and flexible
approach to law as well.
II. GLOBALIZATION, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, AND THE DEMOCRACY
DEFICIT
The globalizing state fuses in approach and in rhetoric the cost-conscious
language of the market with the public interest goals of the state, eliminating
any bright-line distinctions that once might have existed between "the market"
and "the state." The fusion between public and private that results is not unlike
that which occurs between the global and local, as the local and the global
become "modalities of a single, dynamic system (broadly speaking), not simply
an arrangement of parts and a whole., 55 However, the combination of
fusions-public and private and global and local-can create legal confusions,
particularly given the way U.S. law is geared to bright-line distinctions between
public and private.
While the private provision of public services is of a piece with the need for
global competitiveness generally, the essentially public nature of the enterprise
can be lost in approaches to accountability that are oriented towards aggregate
cost and profitability rather than individual justice and democratic
participation. 6 More importantly, the discourse that results and the means by
which success is determined often are dominated by economic values without
any effective way of determining what noneconomic values are relevant and
how their importance might be assessed. This is particularly a concern when
we are dealing with privatization and social services for the poor, but the ability
of market discourses to dominate other kinds of public values is not limited
only to welfare recipients or prisoners. Market values and the kinds of
accountability that markets enforce are not necessarily sufficient in a variety of
contexts-from education to snow removal-in need of greater transparency,
57
participation, and explicit consideration of noneconomic values.

55. Aman, supra note 4, at 813.
56. For an interesting analysis of the difficulties of assuring accountability when private actors are
employed, see Diller, supra note 20, at 1121. See also Paul L. Posner, Accountability Challenges of ThirdParty Government, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT 523, 523-51 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002).
57. See Posner, supranote 56.
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The democracy problem is and should be one of the primary concerns of
the new administrative law.58 The democracy problem in globalization arises
from the disjunction between global socioeconomic and political processes, on
the one hand, and local processes of democratic participation, on the other. The
resolution of such disjunctures is most often left to the market; however, in
some contexts (for example, the privatization of prisons), such privatizations
can intensify the democracy problem-because when regulation is given over
to the market, the public may no longer be as directly involved in
decisionmaking, nor is the information that would make public participation
meaningful available. In domestic settings, particularly in the United States,
globalization complicates both the form and content of democracy because it
rearranges the lines between public and private entities, multiplies the number
and range of institutional sites in any one decisionmaking process, and tends to
enlarge the private sector by delegating public functions to private fora.59
There are a variety of possible procedural responses to the procedural and
structural questions presented by privatization. Perhaps the most common form
of response is what we can call a traditional labeling approach: The actions
taken are labeled either public or private. If public, a certain legal regime
naturally follows with the application of the Due Process Clause; if private,
another set of preordained rules may apply, including common law
60
approaches.
There are many problems with the labeling approach, particularly as
applied to social services for the poor. Even if traditional due process
protections extend to such contexts, 6' the constitutional law that now exists may

58. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Limits of Globalizationand the Future ofAdministrative Law: From
Government to Governance, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 379, 383-89 (2001) [hereinafter The Limits of
Globalization]; Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Proposals for Reforming the Administrative Procedure Act:
Globalization,Democracy and the Furtheranceof a GlobalPublic Interest,6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
397, 412-18 (1999) [hereinafter Proposalsfor Reforming the Administrative ProcedureAct].
59. See The Limits of Globalization, supra note 58, 383-84; Proposalsfor Reforming the
Administrative ProcedureAct, supra note 58, 399-401.
60. See, e.g., McKnight v. Richardson, 521 U.S. 399 (1997) (discussing private prisons); see also Boy
Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (discussing state action).
61. Private prisons are treated as "state actors" for purposes of civil rights suits. Street v.
Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 818 (6th Cir. 1996); Payne v. Monroe County, 779 F.Supp.
1330 (S.D. Fla. 1991); DOUGLAS MCDONALD ET AL., PRIVATE PRISONS INTHE UNITED STATES
59 (1988). In West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 57 (1988), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a physician who is
under contract with the state to provide medical services to inmates at a state prison hospital on a part-time
basis acts "under color of state law," within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), when he treats an
inmate. West, 487 U.S. at 57. In the context of private prisons, the court in Payne reiterated the basic principle
that:
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not be very effective and, in most instances, courts are increasingly reluctant to
intervene. 62 Even if this is not the outcome in a particular case, such case-bycase approaches ignore larger democratic needs that a space for politics might
provide. Quite apart from the individual issues of a case, there often are the
larger policy issues that a single court case is not likely to encompass. 63 If, on
the other hand, the private label is invoked, the resort to the common law and
private remedies and regimes may also be insufficient to deal with the public
aspects of the problems involved. More important, and beyond what a private
cause of action might or might not provide, the problem with the labeling
approaches is that they fail to recognize the reasons for the public/private
questions now being presented. Those reasons involve the transformative effect
of the global economy on our legal system and the need to devise responses that
are sufficiently flexible to meet the demands of a world in which the
relationship of markets to states is now significantly different. A transformative
approach to administrative law, one that recognizes that global forces need not
be linear or their market outcomes inevitable, is necessary. 64 Administrative

A § 1983 action can be maintained when it can be established that the defendant acted
under color of state law or exercises power possessed by virtue of state law. In West,
the court found the requisite state action where a private physician was employed by
the state to perform a duty of the state. Where a function which is traditionally the
exclusive prerogative of the state is performed by a private entity, state action is also
present.
Payne, 779 F. Supp. at 1335 (citations omitted).
62. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Due Process Counterrevolutionofthe 1990s?, 96 CoLuM. L. REV. 1973
passim (1996). Cynthia R. Farina, however, takes issue with broad-brush approaches to due process. She
argues that due process rights are not coming to an end. See Cynthia R. Farina, Misusing "Revolution "and
"Reform ": ProceduralDue Process and The New Welfare Act, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 591, 591-92 (1998).
Whether or not courts are likely to and, indeed, should intervene, the questions that remain are whether this is
the best way to generate the kinds of procedural protections necessary to protect individuals in these hybrid
contexts and whether there are needs for public fora that go beyond the issues of an individual case and that
require discussion of the broader policy issues that may be involved, including conflict of interest
considerations that may not rise to a constitutional level.
63. For example, cases dealing with specific prison conditions of certain disciplinary matters will not likely
consider the larger issues often underlying such questions, such as the respective roles of punishment and
rehabilitation in prisons today.
64. See DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS 7-10 (1999). David Held describes the point of
view of a transformationalist in the following way:
[T]ransformationalists make no claims about the future trajectory ofglobalization; nor
do they seek to evaluate the present in relation to some single, fixed ideal-type
globalized world, whether a global market or a global civilization. Rather,
transformationalist accounts emphasize globalization as a long-term historical process
which is inscribed with contradictions and which is significantly shaped by
conj unctural factors.
Id. at 9; see also The Limits of Globalization, supra note 58, at 396-400.
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law can be a means of resisting some aspects of globalization and facilitating
others to understand more fully which changes should be resisted and which
changes should be furthered. The next part argues for the need to understand
the relationship of markets to the state in a new way and why a different theory
of administrative law may be necessary.
A. State-CenteredApproaches to AdministrativeLaw
Administrative law, as reflected in the APA,65 is built around the act's
assumptions about the market and the state, assumptions that reflect the state
action doctrine in the Constitution.66 Due process and other constitutional
67
rights apply to states and state actors, not to the private sector. Administrative
agencies are defined as state actors and the procedural protections that apply,
both constitutional and statutory, are designed for a relatively clearly
demarcated public sphere. 68 It is state-centered by definition.
There are three primary political theories usually invoked to explain how
the state in general and agencies in particular act in relation to the private sector
and interest group lobbying-pluralism, public choice, and republican theory.69
The major theoretical underpinnings of administrative law assume that the
market and the state are separate worlds, though they do interact. Pluralistic
theorists see the outcome of state legislative and regulatory action ultimately as
the product of voluntary interaction among autonomous interest groups. 7° From
this interaction, solutions to problems emerge that are in the public interest. On
the other hand, public choice theorists posit a political marketplace, not unlike
the economic marketplace, where powerful groups demand legislation or
regulation that is ultimately supplied by legislators and regulators. Many of
these theorists reject the notion that there is something even called the public
interest. 71 Republican theorists see legislative and regulatory outcomes as the

65. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (2000).
66. The APA applies to state agencies only. Section 55 1(1) applies to agencies, which it defines as "each
authority of the Government of the United States .... " 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2000).
67. For an excellent analysis of the state actor doctrine and some of its ambiguities, see generally Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument in Favorof ConstitutionalMeta-Analysis in State
Action Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REV. 302 (1995).
68. See supra notes 52 and 53.
69. For an excellent discussion of these theories and their relationship to U.S. and U.K. constitutional and
administrative law, see generally P.P. CRAIG, PUBLIC LAW AND DEMOCRACY INTHE UNITED KINGDOM AND
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1990).
70. See id. at 58-63.
71. See id. at 63-67.

2003]

THE NEED FOR A NEW ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

products of a deliberative process in which a public interest can be defined and
achieved.72
All of these state-centric theories are designed to account for how state
actions come about, either at the legislative or the regulatory level. Agencies
are set squarely in the state sphere, but as a guide to administrative law, this
map is now incomplete. The "province of administrative law" also includes
administration by private entities and hybrid public/private bodies, such as
federal corporations.73 The relationship of the market to the state in such
bodies differs from earlier notions that assumed a relatively clean division
between public and private. Rather than private interest groups persuading
state actors to undertake a certain course of action, public bodies themselves
now often determine who, when, and how to delegate public functions to
private actors. Private actors, either alone or in partnership with the state, are
important administrators and policymakers.7 a States need them to solve
problems and compete effectively in the global economy, and private entities
can now provide certain kinds of technical experience and cost-effective
management.
When one focuses on such mixes of public and private power from a global
point of view, it is apparent that the nature of the state's role and relationship to
global markets and the private sector is changing. Privatized market-oriented
approaches to services and regulation raise theoretical questions that go to the
heart of the U.S. administrative process and require new ways of understanding
it, as well as highlight new risks that can arise from a fusion of public and
private mechanisms and values. For reasons developed below, the risks of a
kind of corporatism taking over are not at all insignificant. Its impact on public
law values and the democracy deficit are potentially profound.
B. The GlobalizingState and the Risks ofNeo-Corporatism
As a practical theory, corporatism has many meanings and it is difficult to
sum up its essence.75 Yet, some of the basic elements of the theory that can be
discerned resonate with many of the privatization trends described above, to the

72. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 31 (1985).
73. See generally THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 3; The PrivateRole in Public
Governance, supra note 15.
74. See generally THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 3.
75. See CRAIG, supra note 69, at 148-53. See generally ALAN CAWSON, CORPORATISM AND POLITICAL

THEORY 22-46 (1986).
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point of suggesting the relevance of a kind of neo-corporatism theory for
administrative law. These neo-corporatist aspects raise serious concerns and
suggest new roles for administrative law to play.
Corporatist theory involves several aspects that are relevant and apply to
the current situation. First, corporatism denies the basic pluralist idea that
policy emerges from the free and voluntary interaction of multiple interest
groups. In effect, it assumes that the government bargains only with selected,
representative interest groups or peak organizations, with subsequent deal76
making among those groups with respect to public policy in key areas.
Second, during the bargaining that ensues, corporatist theory holds that the state
is operating with a public interest goal in mind. It is not a captured entity, but
an independent player with a very important seat at the policymaking table.77 In
so doing, the state does more than simply reflect the sum total of the
preferences of its constituents, but rather seeks to assert its view of the public
interest in the bargaining that ensues. Third, as a result of these state
approaches, corporatist theory holds that the state is elitist in naturedemocratic in neither purpose nor result. The bargaining that the state engages
in, from a corporatist perspective, often represents an attempt to avoid a
confrontational mode of governance and to reach a politics of
accommodation.7 8 To achieve this degree of consensus, however, normal
political processes usually are sidestepped. What often substitutes for
traditional democratic processes are technocratic and managerial solutions. It is
76. Phillippe C. Schmitter has defined corporatism in the following way:
Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the
constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory,
noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories,
recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate
representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing
certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation ofdemands and supports.
Phillippe C. Schmitter, Still the Century of Corporatism, in TRENDS TOWARD CORPORATIST
INTERMEDIATION 7, 13 (Phillippe C. Schmitter & Gerhard Lehmbruck eds., 1979). Though the new
governance, with its emphasis on networks rather than hierarchy, would seem to undercut this view, the
combination of the relatively few groups involved in providing some of the services, such as private prisons,
coupled with the narrowing of the discourse to largely economic terms and the state's need to be as efficient
as possible, all militate in favor of bargaining relationships between the state and the interest groups selected
to undertake the public tasks at hand. But see R. Salisbury, Why No Corporatism in America, in TRENDS
TOWARD CORPORATIST INTERMEDIATION, supra, at 213, 216 ("In the United States however, it has been
unusual for official recognition to be granted any organized indirect groups, and it has been even more rare for
such recognition to be given to groups purporting to speak for an entire section.")
77. See CAWSON, supra note 75, at 35.
78. See. e.g., J. H. H. Weiller, et al., European Democracy and Its Critique, in THE CRISIS OF
REPRESENTATION IN EUROPE 26, 32-33 (1995) (Jack Hayward ed., 1995).

2003]

THE NEED FOR A NEW ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

technocracy and various forms of expertise that often provide the legitimacy for
results that occur outside traditional democratic processes.79
Each of these three aspects of corporatist theory resonate with the ways
current government and governance operate in traditional and, especially, in
privatized contexts. In this sense, I suggest that a type of neo-corporatism may
help explain and highlight the risks to democracy and the fundamental values of
administrative law that some of these hybrid approaches to government can
encourage. While it might initially seem that the idea of peak organizations is
foreign to U.S. politics, given the wide diversity of views and groups that exist,
the reality of the administrative process is quite different. Once issues are
funneled through an administrative process, there usually is a significant dropoff in the number of interest groups with the resources necessary to participate
and therefore capable of influencing agency decisions. Those that do persist
are, in some sense, like peak organizations. They are not chosen or selected by
the government but neither are they infinitely diverse. Perhaps more important,
the economic discourse involved means that most of these groups are likely to
speak the same language. Peak organizations are not at all typical in the United
States, but the economic discourse that increasingly dominates much of
regulation, and certainly, the raison d'etre for privatization, narrows the
discourse in such a way as to make most groups sound essentially the same.
There may be no peak organization, per se, but the discourse is so similar that
this may be a distinction without a difference.
In most privatization contexts involving outsourcing and contracting out,
the number of parties involved is naturally small, often involving, as in the
prison context, only two or three major corporations who compete to manage
prisons."' Once one of these contractors is chosen, as in many contractual
arrangements, long-term relationships may develop, threatening even further to
diminish the number of bargaining parties at the table involved. "A mutually
dependent bargaining relationship emerges between government and the
corporate sector, in which favorable policies are traded for co-operation and
As one commentator on corporatist theory notes:
expertise.
...[P]luralism

and private:

is prescribed on a separation between public

between the sphere of government, and the

79. See id.
80. See Sharon Dolovitch, Address at the UCLA Law Review Symposium (Mar. 1,2002).
81. CRAIG, supra note 69, at 150.
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private groups of civil society. By contrast the stress within
corporatist writing has been on the growing interepresentation
of the public and the private spheres. The crucial concept is
that of public policy as the outcome of a bargaining process
between state agencies and those organized interests whole
power in the political marketplace means that their cooperation is indispensable if agreed policies are to
implemented.82
Indeed, the globalizing state needs not only the political support of certain
groups but their know-how and expertise to carry out tasks in cost-effective
and, often, politically uncontroversial ways.
The relationship of technical expertise to the state and the ability of private
providers to produce it suggests another neo-corporatist element in governance
at the domestic level. While technical expertise may very well constitute an
important mode of legitimacy, the use of an economic discourse alone may be
too narrow to qualify as a mode of legitimacy, especially when we are dealing
with social services that have significant noneconomic values at stake.83 If only
efficiency values are relevant, the use of this kind of technocracy as a
legitimizing device may simply be a mask for ideology 84 and, as such, not a
mode of legitimacy at all. Such an approach would further some of the worst
aspects of corporatism if there is no opportunity to temper economic values
with noneconomic values.
The need for increased bargaining on the part of the state to achieve goals
that are realistically enforceable is indicative of a state that can no longer
accomplish its objectives by direct command-control regulations. This is true
for a number of reasons. First, as noted above, the processes of globalization
can restrict a state's options in various ways, not the least of which is that they
make it relatively easy for some industries to move production around the
globe, avoiding excess costs, but often affecting local political decisions that
involve local employment opportunities as well. Thus, there is a greater
premium on the part of the state to negotiate with potential regulatees, perhaps
to convince them of the necessity of the regulation and that what it proposes is
82. CAWSON, supra note 75, at 35.
83. For a critique of the use of technocracy in this sense, see Weiller, supra note 78, at 33. "The
technocratic and managerial solutions often mask ideological choices which are not debated and subject to
public scrutiny beyond the immediate interests related to the regulatory or management area." Id.
84. See id.
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as cost-effective as possible . This relates closely to enforcement. As the
funding of agencies decreases, effective enforcement of the regulations
promulgated by agencies increasingly requires the cooperation of the regulated.
They need to be given the discretion to reach the desired results in ways that
make sense for them. Industries also increasingly need to be part of the
planning and regulatory process. 86
The increasing reliance on markets, market approaches, and private actors
as substitutes for more direct forms of governmental involvement highlight
efficiency concerns, and they also suggest a regulatory discourse that is much
closer to market concerns and modes of operation than what a more public
discourse is likely to produce. The outcomes produced are likely to be more in
tune with economic interests; a market discourse applies especially easily to
companies doing business in multiple countries. They are freer to reject the
political costs of doing business in any one jurisdiction if they can move
production around the globe relatively easily. 87
Whether or not a new corporatism accurately describes or accounts forfrom a pure theoretical point of view-the relationship of the government to
interest groups, there are elements of the theory that raise serious concerns
when viewed through the lens of privatization, particularly hybrid
public/private approaches dealing with social services that involve issues that
inevitably go well beyond a purely economic discourse.
Administrative law has always been grounded upon basic norms. These
norms include transparency, participation, and fairness, and they are built upon
the norm of democracy. Indeed, it may be that the purpose of a new
administrative law is to bring legitimacy to the public/private decisionmaking
process by creating a space for a politics that can involve economic and
noneconomic values. When one starts from the premise-namely, that a
process is developing that is best described as neo-corporatist in character, one
that fuses the public and the private in ways that make it easy for the economic
side of the discourse to dominate certain aspects of policy-fundamental issues

85. For a case study on the role various corporatist approaches played in attracting foreign investment to
some states in the Midwest, see generally ROBERT PERRUCCI, JAPANESE AUTO TRANSPLANTS IN THE
HEARTLAND: CORPORATISM AND COMMUNITY (1994).

86. For a general discussion of the private involvement in relation to administrative accountability, see The
PrivateRole in Public Governance, supra note 15, at 574-92 (analyzing "the reality of the extensive private
role in every dimension of administration and regulation").
87. See generally DICKEN, supra note 27.
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emerge, as well as an opportunity for administrative law to play a significant
role for reform.
C. Emerging Issues
Perhaps the most important set of procedural and structural problems that
arises from the neo-corporatist trends noted above involves what I have called a
"democracy deficit." Privatization has been one of the primary forms of
marketization in the United States. Some might say that there is not great
tradeoff for democracy if snow removal shifts from a city garage to a private
contractor or even if a publicly operated prison is now managed by a for-profit
private corporation. Nonetheless, the fact that such trends in management are
driven by global processes assures us that a larger transformation is underway.
The connection between the relatively minor example of snow removal and the
more significant changes in approach to prisons or welfare is in their common
connection to globalization and the structural aspects of their insulation from
the public.
Democracy involves more than just market forces and outcomes. It
involves and requires more than representation and a chance to hold public
officials accountable through the ballot box. 88 Legitimacy comes in many
forms and through many fora. Administrative law can facilitate the creation of
multiple fora for policy discussions to occur. It can help, if necessary, a politics
to develop if contractual obligations are not met or need to be revised.
Focusing on the "democracy deficit" brought about by globalization does not
mean that only traditional legitimacy arguments, so common in administrative
law, are relevant. 89 In fact, the major difference between legitimacy concerns
expressed in traditional public law terms and today's concerns. We have

88. See The PrivateRole in Public Governance, supranote 15, at 664-73 (discussing the true measures of
"aggregate accountability"); Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 711, 755-69

(2001).
89. Proposalsfor Reforming the Administrative ProcedureAct, supra note 58, at 412-13; Aman, supra
note 4, at 816-19. For perspectives on democracy and administrative law in Eastern Europe, see generally
Paul Brietzke, Democratizationand... AdministrativeLaw, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 1(1999), which stresses that a
well-structured administrative state is crucial to the democratization process. Randall Peerenboom has
conversely proposed that deregulation and involving private actors in rulemaking and implementation may
actually serve to reduce the Chinese "democracy deficit" by inviting shared governance. Randall Peerenboom,
Globalization, PathDependency and the Limits of Law: AdministrativeLaw Reform and Rule ofLaw in the
People's Republic of China, 19 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 161,253-58 (2001). Because China maintains a vast
administrative bureaucracy that is inaccessible to citizens, reform is seen to encourage accountability, even
though Peerenboom recognizes that private actors also have accountability concerns. See id. at 257.
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moved from questions concerning the proper role of judges as opposed to
legislators, when it comes to policymaking, to issues concerning whether there
will be any public input at all. It is not just a connection with an elected official
that matters. What matters more are opportunities for interested individuals to
have input in policymaking processes generally, as well as in the specific cases
that may affect them.
Beyond traditional notions of electoral accountability, democracy requires
the means by which issues can be drawn, information shared, and a meaningful
politics created. This involves multiple fora for values and views to be
expressed publicly, issues beyond those likely to be relevant to just an
economic conception of the problems at hand. Legitimacy requires more than a
process simply to "check up" on those in positions of responsibility, to see if
they are doing their job. It also involves creating the kind of information
necessary to understand the issues involved for a real debate to ensue and for
new ideas to be suggested. Administrative law can and should play an
important role in making fora available to consider and assess new approaches
to issues including those considered by public/private hybrids as well. The
public/private distinction should not unduly shield decisionmaking processes
from opportunities for participation and the articulation of values and points of
view that enrich our politics and, indeed, make meaningful political discussion
possible.
Closely related to these democracy concerns are questions of citizenship.
Quite apart from the decisionmakers involved, how do we conceptualize those
affected by these decisions? In addition to being citizens, individuals are
increasingly treated as consumers, customers, and clients as well. Each of these
labels--citizen, customer/consumer, and client--carry different expectations
with regard to individual and collective responsibility for the provision of
services. 90 At what point does the convergence of market processes, private
decisionmakers, and individuals as consumers, customers, or clients actually
90. For a discussion of the respective roles of citizen, client, and privacy, see Alfred C. Aman, Jr.,
Information, Privacy,and Technology: Citizens, Clients, or Consumers? in FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 327, 327 (Jack Beatson & Yvonne Cupps eds., 2000). In that article, I explained:
The role of consumer and client differ ... when citizens are clients they are, in effect,
part of a contract for carrying out a public function. In other words, they are like thirdparty beneficiaries . . . . As consumers, however, citizens undertake certain
transactions for themselves alone. Citizens as clients may need information from the
government and the private sector, but as consumers, they may need to prevent
personal information from being used privately in ways of which they are unaware.
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undercut our ability as citizens to engage in the broader kinds of participation
necessary for a vibrant political process? 9' It is important that the legal
discourses triggered by the public/private distinction do not undercut or mask
the role that citizens need to play.
A third related set of issues for the new administrative law involves conflict
of interest concerns. The state-centric aspects of traditional administrative law
have focused primarily only on public administrators, and when it comes to
conflict questions the law asks such questions as whether there was a personal
economic interest tied to the decision involved,92 whether there were
inappropriate ex parte93 contacts, or whether there was undue bias on the part of
the decisionmaker involved.94 Economic gain is a particularly relevant criterion
when applied to some forms of privatization, where the decisionmakers
involved are chosen in part because of the incentives provided by their duty to
try to make a profit. Clearly, to obviate this problem, the parameters of the
delegated task must be set forth with clarity. Delegation-like doctrine
requirements can and should surface in this context, because it can only be
assumed that a private prison provider will want to carry out its duties in as
profitable a manner as possible. To assure that this does not include riding
roughshod over prisoners' rights, legislative and contractual detail is necessary.
Such an approach can thus eliminate a financial conflict by making clear the
challenges the contractor must meet before any profit is possible.
In contexts covered by the APA, conflict questions turn largely on the
nature of the proceedings involved. Are they adjudicatory or legislative? Such
91. See HINDY LAUER SCHACHTER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT OR REINVENTING OURSELVES? 7-9

(1997); Aman, supra note 4, at 799.
92. See, e.g., Tummey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927). In Tummey, the Court noted the inherent
conflict that an economic interest in the outcome created:
[T]he requirement of due process of law in judicial procedure is not satisfied by the
argument that men of the highest honor and the greatest self-sacrifice could carry it out
without danger of injustice. Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation
to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the
defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true
between the State and the accused, denies the latter due process of law.
Id.
93. 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(l)(B) (2000), which provides:
[N]o member of the body comprising the agency, administrative law judge, or other
employee who is or may reasonably be expected to be involved in the decisional
process of the proceeding, shall make or knowingly cause to be made to any interested
person outside the agency an ex parte communication relevant to the merits of the
proceeding.
Id.
94. See, e.g., United States Steel Workers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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a discourse normally would not apply in privatized settings. Private providers
are implementing public policies, but of course new policies and approaches
inevitably emerge in the dynamic contexts in which they operate. Moreover,
there are some new, deregulated markets in which private bodies and private
actors now make decisions with significant public implications. This clearly is
one of the lessons of the Enron debacle. 9 More specifically, private providers
of public services clearly have the profit motive in mind-that is, their
obligations to their shareholders. Yet, public policy concerns may require
approaches, actions, or the sharing of information in a timely fashion that might
further some public goals, but increase private costs. What are the conflicts of
interest requirements of such participants in these contexts? The very nature of
public and private enterprises differ. The profit motive can be a good incentive,
but, in public settings, it is not the sole goal, and it can conflict with other
values.
Indeed, what happens when market-oriented, bottom-line
considerations drive decisions that adversely affect human rights? A private
prison provider may have more incentives to construe as narrowly as possible
the due process or Eighth Amendment requirements of the Constitution, even
assuming they apply fully in a private setting.96 Can all such matters be dealt
with specifically before they arise, by statute, without unnecessarily burdening
public/private decisionmaking processes?
III. REFORMS

The risks of neo-corporatism and the changing relationship of the market to
the state suggest the need for reforms. In engaging in this process, it is
important to understand the pluralistic aspects of the law developing in various
privatization contexts,9 7 but at the same time it is also important to reorganize
the need for basic democratic values to be furthered. Democracy and neutrality
are essential for the legitimacy of any regime with broad public significance;
this is particularly true when we are dealing with social services involving the
95. See, e.g., Richard A. Oppel, Jr., U.S. Regulators Are Requiring Full Detailsof Energy Sales, N.Y.
TIMES, May 15, 2002, at C1.
96. See Joseph E. Field, Making Prisons Private: An ImproperDelegation ofa GovernmentalPower, 15
HOFSTRA L. REV. 649,662-63 ("The presence of a profit motive results in private prisons substituting the goal
of the general welfare of society with the goal of profit maximization. In this manner, cost considerations may
hamper, if not totally override, society's interest in correctional policy.")
97. As Lester Salamon has noted with regard to the many tools of govemance now employed, each has its
own "political economy" and each "imparts its own 'twist' to the operation of the programs that embody it."
Salamon, supra note 14, at 2.
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poor, as in welfare, or with prisoners. Markets and market processes are but
means to ends in these contexts. By definition, welfare recipients and prisoners
fall outside the normal economy. But quite apart from the demands for
transparency, participation, and fairness in such contexts, privatization raises
important accountability and legitimacy concerns, particularly when it is no
longer simply a device among many for the way governments operate but is
nothing short of a quiet revolution in how to cope with public problems.9 8 The
APA of the twenty-first century must find ways to ensure that the values of
administrative law remain relevant. To accomplish this, I suggest beginning
with three basic reforms.
First, it is important to recognize that the public or private label we place on
an actor wielding power over others is less important than the power
relationshipsthat are established. To this end, we might take a page from the
United Kingdom's approach to natural justice questions.99 Procedural
protections should be designed to assure there is a flow of information about
the operation of hybrid partnerships and the creation of a meaningful politics.
A twenty-first century APA should apply to some private actors as well as the
state, particularly when private actors have significant power over the
constituents with whom they deal and they are engaged in public functions.
Extension of the APA does not mean the same procedures must be used that
were devised for a different era, or that we over-judicialize hybrid
arrangements. However, we need to create new and alternative ways to assure
that the basic values of administrative law are furthered. New, informal, and
flexible procedures must be developed.
At the same time, there are some APA provisions that remain relevant and
should be amended. The contracting-out provision in section 553 is a prime
example.' 0 0 Contracts used to outsource social services to the poor or to private
prison managers should be viewed as rules, subject to notice and comment, and
as the beginning of a process, not the end of a private negotiation. As I have
argued elsewhere, 10 ' contracts of this kind are part of an evolving process of
governance, not the final result of private negotiations. Input on a regular basis

98. See id. at 1.
99. See, e.g., Bonsor v. Musicians' Union I Ch. 479 (1954); R. v. Monopolies and Mergers Comm. Ex. p.
Argyll Group Pic 2 All E.R. 257, (Court of Appeal 1986).
100. Section 553 of the APA provides exemptions from its general rulemaking procedures. Among these is
one granted for "matter[s] relating to ... contract." 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (2000). This exemption has,
however, generally been construed narrowly by the courts.
101. Aman, supra note 28, at 1502.
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is necessary if citizens are to have a meaningful role in the policymaking
process. If policy questions arise within the framework of the contract
involved, the flexibility necessary to react to them on the part of citizens should
exist. Contracts need to be open to such change if participation is to be
meaningful.
Many conflict of interest concerns can also be addressed in terms of
contract reform. Not unlike the delegation doctrine, there must be a level of
specificity in the contract provided sufficient to make clear the obligations of
the provider involved: Not only what must be accomplished but how should be
specified to ensure that some efficiencies are not achieved for the wrong
reasons. Administrative law also needs to further the development of new
approaches beyond the extension of well-known procedural types of
protections. One approach to conflict of interest problems is to involve third
parties as auditors in various contexts. What the Government Accounting
Office does for public policies might be duplicated by private group
certification of the private delivery of social services. For example, as
Professor Robert Fischman has noted, "Market certification of sustainable
forest management is a new development of the past decade."' 2 Professor
Fischman describes the Forest Stewardship Council as "an independent, nonprofit coalition of environmental groups, citizens, economic development
organizations, and the timber industry," who sponsor private audits of forestry
practices. Providing information and the opportunity for input and dialogue by
a variety of private parties deeply concerned with all of the issues-economic
and environmental-can help further a relatively unbiased approach to
policymaking. As the Enron debacle now stirs Congress to action, and
accounting firms are likely to be regulated for conflict of interest concerns, this
could be an opportunity to consider the kinds of conflicts that arise in the
hybrid partnerships we have been discussing. Congress should not overlook
this significant area of governance as it seeks to reform the accounting industry.
The province of administrative law is broad. It can and should involve the
application of public law values to private actors and the creation of informal
approaches to ensure that a multiplicity of voices are heard and that
noneconomic as well as economic issues are considered.

102. Robert L. Fischman, Stumbling to Johannesburg: The United States' HaphazardProgress Toward
Sustainable ForestryLaw, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,291, 10,304 (2002).
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CONCLUSIONS

My purpose in this Article has been to suggest that administrative law is an
appropriate and timely arena within which to address some of the
antidemocratic tendencies inherent in globalization. I have focused especially
on privatization, because it is most visibly in that context that globalization can
be seen to set the premium on the innovations that bring states and businesses
into partnerships and hybrid arrangements in new ways. This in itself is not
antidemocratic; indeed, I have stressed both the necessity and the desirability of
acknowledging the extent to which states might take a legitimate interest in the
conditions affecting investment, entrepreneurship, and market share. Rather,
my concern is with the fact that the pragmatics of those initiatives concentrate
decisionmaking power and authority at the executive level (of both government
and corporations), and correspondingly tend to preclude public involvement in
ways that an agency-mandated deregulatory process, for example, would not.
As certain issues move from the hearing room to the boardroom, public
participation diminishes, but not the need for public participation; transparency
and accountability to the public (beyond the shareholders) are similarly
diminished-but not the need for transparency and accountability.
Globalization-with its steep competitive gradients and high stakes in
profits gained or lost-makes these developments signs of a pattern of change
that in my view is likely to sharpen and accelerate, excluding citizens from
participation (even at the level of information) in the decisions that define the
value of their tax dollars as well as the scope of the state's democratic
institutions. Reform is urgent. Finding meaningful ways of addressing the
democracy deficit is timely and worthwhile, given the inherent value of
preserving the maximum scope for democratic responsibility.
The value I have placed on democracy in the course of this Article is, in my
view, an appropriate reflection of the value of democracy as an end in itselfgiven its inherently fundamental importance to the classical liberal ideal. By
this I mean that I accord the highest priority to law's use as a means of
protecting and preserving the fora for democratic deliberation. Even if
executives in seclusion reach the same decision as an agency operating in full
sunshine, the democracy deficit reflects the lost opportunity for the public to
participate in the deliberation by which the value regimes that determine
outcomes are themselves defined, distinguished, and decided from among
plural possibilities. This particular value-the value of deliberation over
values-is especially important as globalization intensifies the contact among
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different value regimes and social priorities. In short, I regard as inherently
appealing a forum in which people can respond to globalization by deciding the
price, so to speak, they are willing to pay for efficiency and profitability, and by
doing so in contexts where they can and must negotiate their priorities with
other stakeholders-even stakeholders from other countries.
Administrative law is appropriate as the vehicle for addressing the
democracy deficit in this way. It is in administrative law that the rules for
public participation in the form of information and input, as well as for
government and industry accountability, are set. The APA is available as a
platform for procedural reforms of this kind, that is, reforms that would counter
the democracy deficit by retaining the segments of the private sector that were
spawned by privatization or public-pnivate hybrids within the purview of the
APA's procedures. It need not be applied in old ways, but reformulated and
reconceptualized for the problems and possibilities of a global era.
Finally, I would suggest that taking account of the global context in which
administrative law now functions also means theorizing afresh the nature of
pluralism and republicanism in relation to the administrative process. It is, of
course, possible to conceive of privatization and democracy in terms of the
classical theories of pluralism and republicanism-as but one technology of
marketization among others, and as one deliberative process among others. As
I indicated at the outset, though, pluralism and republicanism as currently
framed imply a territorialized state, and indeed a nation-state that contains all
the prospective participants-and these on more or less equal footing before the
state. As currently framed, these theories cannot account for the highly
ambiguous line between the public and private sectors in practice,or the extent
to which key industries or even individual companies might figure in a
government's policy planning. It would be naive to imagine that such fusions
do not exist, or to imagine that they are not necessary. Absent democratic
checks, the current scenario appears to be evolving in a way reminiscent of
corporatism, at least to the extent that public-private partnership is now at the
very core of the state's self-legitimating practices. My recommendations for
addressing the democracy deficit are not aimed at rolling back the clock, but at
acknowledging the current state of affairs and exposing that fusion at the core
of government to democratic procedures and open political debate.
Administrative law can play a vital role in the new governance structures and
processes now taking shape, ensuring opportunities for individuals, in their
capacities as citizens, to participate in the decisions that significantly affect our
lives and the communities of which we are a part.

